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Impairments in social cognition and perspective-taking play an important role in the
psychopathology and social functioning of individuals with social anxiety, autism, or
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, among other clinical presentations. Perspective-
taking has mostly been studied using the concept of Theory of Mind (ToM), which
describes the sequential development of these skills in young children, as well as clinical
populations experiencing perspective-taking difficulties. Several studies mention positive
results of ToM based training programs; however, the precise processes involved in the
achievement of these improvements are difficult to determine. Relational Frame Theory
(RFT) is a modern behavioral account of complex cognitive functions, and is argued
to provide a more precise approach to the assessment and training of perspective-
taking, among other relational skills. Results of RFT-based studies of perspective-taking
in developmental and clinical settings are discussed. The development of training
methods targeting perspective-taking deficits from an RFT point of view appears to
provide promising applications for the enhancement of current treatments of people
with social-cognitive dysfunctions.
Keywords: schizophrenia, autism, social cognition, perspective-taking, Relational Frame Theory
SOCIAL COGNITION
Social cognition has long been a focus in social, cognitive, and clinical psychology. Its importance
is not surprising given that social cognition allows us to select, interpret and use social information
(Aronson and Wilson, 2005), and that these in turn are critical to our understanding of self and
others, the wider social context and how we can relate to these. It is equally well established that
perspective-taking skills are central to social cognition, given that they enable us to distinguish
between mental states of self and others, and to take the perspective of another. Indeed, perspective-
taking is a pre-requisite for many aspects of complex social interaction, including empathy, irony,
humor, and deception (Heagle and Rehfeldt, 2006; Barnes-Holmes, unpublished doctoral thesis).
Given the centrality of perspective-taking in social cognition, individuals with problems in the
former naturally display a broad range of problems in the latter (Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006;
Couture et al., 2006). For example, individuals with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
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are well-known for impairments in mental state attribution,
social reciprocity, emotion perception and empathy, all of which
negatively affect social interaction and communication (Yirmiya
et al., 1996; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000).
It was suggested by Frith (1992) that similar deficits occur
in individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and account,
to some extent, for characteristic features of social functioning
that are observed in both positive and negative symptoms.
Specifically, impairments in discriminating the mental states
of the self and others may contribute to hallucinations and
delusions, as well as the absence of meaningful social interaction.
Furthermore, Hardy-Bayle (1994) argued that deficits in mental
state attribution are associated with thought disorganization
and the inability to abstract contextual information regarding
social behavior. At the present time, there is a well-supported
body of evidence from social-cognitive studies to suggest that
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia show impairments
in mental state attribution (Corcoran et al., 1995; Sprong et al.,
2007) and perspective-taking (Langdon et al., 2001; Villatte
et al., 2010b), even during phases of remission (Bora et al.,
2009).
During acute psychotic phases, treatment of schizophrenia
mainly targets hallucinations and delusions through
pharmacological means, with some short-term success
(Slooff et al., 2006). However, life-long medication is often
recommended (Kissling, 1991; Davis, 2006) and significant
concerns with this type of regime surround the many
unpleasant side effects observed (e.g., extrapyramidal symptoms,
hypotension and intestinal complaints) and problems with
medication compliance (Slooff et al., 2006). Some of these
side effects have been reduced with the development of
second-generation antipsychotic drugs, and improvements in
negative symptoms have been reported (Woo et al., 2009).
Still, pharmacological regimes that focus primarily on the
suppression of positive symptoms leave impairments in social
functioning and perspective-taking untouched. Psychosocial
treatment focusing on these factors, therefore, complements
current treatments of schizophrenia (Kern et al., 2009; Woo
et al., 2009).
Given the pivotal role of perspective-taking in social
functioning, it is not surprising that many other clinical
categories that include social impairments also present with
difficulties in perspective-taking or mental state attribution.
Results from social-cognitive studies indicate that these include
schizotypy (Langdon and Coltheart, 1999; Langdon et al., 2001;
Platek et al., 2003; Pickup, 2006), frontotemporal dementia
(Gregory et al., 2002), brain damage/degenerative brain disease
(for an overview see Brüne, 2005), alcohol use disorder
(Uekermann and Daum, 2008), cocaine use disorder (Hulka et al.,
2013, 2015; Preller et al., 2014a,b), borderline personality disorder
(Herpertz and Bertsch, 2014; Sharp et al., 2015), depression
(Lee et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Ladegaard et al., 2014),
anxiety (Bodner et al., 2012; Samson et al., 2012) and obsessive
compulsive disorder (Sayin et al., 2010). As a result, perspective-
taking skills are of pivotal importance to many domains in clinical
research and practice.
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
The dominant theoretical paradigm in the study of perspective-
taking is Theory of Mind (ToM). Originally described by
Premack and Woodruff (1978), ToM refers to the ability to infer
the beliefs, intentions, thoughts and emotions of the self and
others, and advocates of the theory have described the natural
trajectory of these skills from simple to complex perspective-
taking (Howlin et al., 1999). In typical development, perspective-
taking skills are believed to be fully developed by around age
six, although some evidence suggests that these repertoires
remain somewhat inflexible even until late adolescence or early
adulthood (Keysar et al., 2003; Dumontheil et al., 2010).
Many theoretical accounts have been proposed within ToM
research (Ensink and Mayes, 2010). As the most prevalent
account of ToM, Premack and Woodruff (1978) proposed that
ToM can be viewed as a theory that children develop about others’
minds, also referred to as the theory-theory account (Premack
and Woodruff, 1978; Astington and Gopnik, 1991). Simulation
theorists, on the other hand, argue that people identify with
another person’s perspective and are, thereby, able to simulate
his/her experience (Harris et al., 1989). Proponents of nativistic
accounts state that ToM is a result of innate processes in the
brain, and that the development of these skills is dependent
on the maturation of these mechanisms (for an overview see
Ensink and Mayes, 2010). Indeed, results from neuroimaging
studies indicate that specific areas of the brain (temporal lobes,
inferior parietal cortex, frontal lobes) may be involved in ToM
(Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Evidence also suggests that
“mirror neurons” play a part in the development of these skills
(Mayes et al., 2009). This specific type of neuron is activated both
during an action and during observation of that same action in
another person, and is therefore argued to be of importance in
imitation and understanding of intentions (Ensink and Mayes,
2010). Furthermore, ToM skills have been linked to executive
functioning (e.g., Frye et al., 1995; Perner and Lang, 2000).
As a mainstream developmental approach to perspective-
taking, ToM has substantial descriptive and conceptual merit,
and was the first to offer a coherent account of the putative
components of these pivotal skills. In addition, evidence supports
the application of these concepts through remedial interventions,
either aimed at ToM specifically or as a part of broader
training in social cognition. For example, Fisher and Happé
(2005) reported improvements in ToM performance in children
diagnosed with ASD, while Gevers et al. (2006) described similar
outcomes with children with a pervasive developmental disorder.
ToM skills have also been successfully trained in adults with
high-functioning autism (Turner-Brown et al., 2008). Positive
results for social cognitive ToM training were found as well
in patients with schizophrenia; for an extensive overview see
Horan et al. (2008) or Brüne and Juckel (2010). Although
these positive clinical outcomes are promising, it is difficult
to determine precisely the processes of perspective-taking that
are being enhanced during training. That is, the middle-
level and higher-level concepts employed in ToM (e.g., mental
state attribution and social cognition) do not directly specify
psychological or behavioral processes. So while one might
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realistically assume, as the evidence suggests, that perspective-
taking and social cognition more broadly operate through similar
processes or mechanisms, neither concept “explains” what those
mechanisms are. This conceptual shortfall not only limits our
understanding of these skills in normative development and
that which underpins clinical presentations, but also restricts the
development of research methodologies and interventions. In
the section below, the paper explores an alternative approach
to understanding perspective-taking that emanates directly from
Relational Frame Theory (RFT), a modern behavioral account of
human language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2001).
RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY
Key Concepts
As one would expect from a behavioral theory, RFT concerns
itself with the interactions between an organism and the
environment, and the account is in this respect also
philosophically contextual and functional. In short, RFT
proposes that language and cognition primarily involve a
learning process known as arbitrarily applicable relational
responding (AARR). In short, complex and subtle contextual
cues in the environment facilitate the derivation of arbitrary
relations among stimuli or events. For example, if a speaker
says “apples are like oranges,” the phrase “is like” acts as a
contextual cue for the listener to derive a relation of similarity,
or co-ordination, between apples and oranges. In addition, the
words “apples” and “oranges” themselves are co-ordinated with
the actual fruits symbolized by the words. Cognitive development
is believed to involve the emergence of elaborate and complex
networks of these relations (Blackledge, 2003), which we use in
complex cognitive functions like problem-solving, humor, and
perspective-taking. For example, understanding metaphor is
believed to involve relating relational networks to other relational
networks (Foody et al., 2014).
Empirical evidence on RFT across several decades supports
the theory’s core concept of arbitrarily applicable relational
responding (i.e. deriving relations) and indicates that these
complex skills proliferate in the absence of direct training (Hayes
et al., 2001). Furthermore, studies have identified a number
of families of relational frames (i.e., patterns of relating) that
share the same core processes but have different formal features.
These may be summarized as: co-ordination (i.e., similarity
or sameness); distinction (difference); opposition; comparison;
hierarchy; and perspective-taking (known in RFT as deictic
relations). There is also a growing body of evidence on the
relationship between these skills and: language/higher cognition;
IQ; developmental delays; and other clinical presentations (e.g.,
schizophrenia and social anxiety). For a recent book-length
review of this evidence, see Dymond and Roche (2013).
The RFT Account of Perspective-Taking
For RFT, the deictic or perspective-taking relations lie at the
very heart of language, complex cognition and a sense of self,
because they comprise the constant perspective from which a
verbally sophisticated individual interprets his/her environment.
Specifically, the theory proposes three types of perspective-taking
relations: the interpersonal relations of I and YOU; the spatial
relations of HERE and THERE; and the temporal relations of
NOW and THEN. Indeed, these concepts are highly similar
to those widely used in the developmental literature and the
specific literature on the concept of self (Howlin et al., 1999;
Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001).
According to RFT, we learn to derive deictic relations
across everyday questions such as “What are you doing
there?” and “What was it like yesterday?” That is, common
social interactions create a history in which specific words
come to function as contextual cues for deriving the
perspective-taking relations in a given context. Furthermore,
the interpersonal, spatial and temporal relations interact
with each other in various ways, thereby adding both
complexity and constancy to our perspectives. For example,
I always operates from the HERE and NOW, and from that
perspective YOU/OTHERS are always anchored THERE
and THEN. For RFT, these behaviors of relating comprise
core features of one’s sense of self, as well as one’s sense of
others.
Early empirical investigations of the perspective-taking
relations, in RFT work with young children, have explored
whether the three types of relations are in fact functionally
distinct from one another, hence each constituting a valid
functional concept. With this purpose, Barnes-Holmes
TABLE 1 | The core relational skills involved in perspective-taking
(McHugh et al., 2008).
Relation type Level of relational complexity
Simple
relations
Reversed
relations
Double reversed
relations
I–YOU Simple I–YOU Reversed I–YOU
HERE–THERE Simple I–YOU
and simple
HERE–THERE
Reversed I–YOU
and simple
HERE–THERE
Simple I–YOU and
reversed
HERE–THERE
Double reversed
I–YOU and
HERE–THERE
NOW—THEN I and simple
NOW–THEN
YOU
and simple
NOW–THEN
I and reversed
NOW–THEN
YOU and reversed
NOW–THEN
I and simple
HERE–THERE
and simple
NOW–THEN
I and reversed
HERE-THERE and
simple NOW–THEN
I and simple
HERE–THERE and
reversed
NOW–THEN
I and double
reversed
HERE–THERE and
NOW–THEN
YOU
and simple
HERE–THERE
and simple
NOW–THEN
YOU and reversed
HERE–THERE and
simple NOW–THEN
YOU and simple
HERE–THERE and
reversed
NOW–THEN
YOU and double
reversed
HERE–THERE and
NOW–THEN
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(unpublished doctoral thesis) developed an extensive protocol
exploring the three relations and how they interact with one
another at different levels (see Table 1 for a detailed overview
of the trial types). For example, in a simple I-YOU trial, a
child was asked to imagine a scenario in which “I have a
green brick and you have a red brick” and was then asked
“Which brick do I/you have?” This trial simply gages whether
the child can respond correctly on the basis of I versus YOU
(i.e., whether the words “I” and “you” control the appropriate
perspectives). Simple HERE–THERE trials follow a similar
hypothetical format: “I am sitting here on the blue chair and
you are sitting there on the black chair. Where am I sitting?
Where are you sitting?” And the research also investigated
simple NOW–THEN relations. However, in order to gage
whether the child can respond correctly on the basis of NOW
versus THEN, the early research parsed out I and YOU trials
to circumvent problems in derivation. For example, if I say
“Yesterday I was reading, today you are watching TV,” you
will not have enough information to derive either what I
am doing today or what you were doing yesterday. This
problem only applies to NOW–THEN relations. However, it is
important to note that neither spatial nor temporal relations
have meaning without an interpersonal perspective from
which to determine them (i.e., there is no “here” or “now”
without I).
While these three types of deictic relations already show
considerable complexity, particularly in the ways in which they
interact with each other, Barnes-Holmes (unpublished doctoral
thesis) demonstrated even greater complexity by reversing and
further integrating the three relations. In short, trials were created
to assess the extent to which children were capable of taking the
perspective of another (e.g., reversing the functions of “I” and
“you”). Being able to do this would likely indicate some level
of relational flexibility. Indeed, complex social interactions are
embedded within the need to see the world as someone else
sees it, without losing our own perspective. Other variations
in the protocol include reversed HERE–THERE and NOW–
THEN relations, as well as two simultaneously reversed deictic
relations, thus increasing complexity and interaction between
relations even further. While these types of complex relational
tasks would be rarely required in natural language, there may
be instances, for example in complex logic, where one would
need the flexibility to be able to separate the relations in
this way.
The findings from the original research, and much
subsequently, have indicated clear functional distinctions
among the three perspective-taking relations and among
the three levels of relational complexity (simple, reversed
and double reversed). For example, participants of almost
all ages show competence on I–YOU relations, poorer
performances on HERE–THERE relations, and weaker still
performances on NOW–THEN relations (McHugh et al., 2004).
Furthermore, they show some competence on simple relations,
poorer performances on reversed relations and even poorer
performances on double reversals. The evidence also suggests
a developmental trend in the emergence of perspective-taking
skills according to these sequences, which is in line with
the developmental literature more broadly (Howlin et al.,
1999). Similarly, correlational analyses suggest at least some
potential overlap between the processes underpinning both
relational perspective-taking and ToM (Villatte et al., 2008,
2010b).
The Role of Deictic Relations in Clinical
Samples
Following the early developmental RFT studies on perspective-
taking, the Barnes-Holmes protocol has been administered
in several clinical samples known for their perspective-taking
difficulties and interesting patterns of results have been observed.
For example, children with ASD have been found to have
lower accuracies than their typically developing peers, especially
regarding deictic reversals (Rehfeldt et al., 2007). McGuinness
(unpublished master’s thesis) administered the protocol to nine
participants diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, and found
diminished performances on both reversed and double-reversed
trials. Furthermore, Villatte et al. (2010b) found lower accuracies
on the deictic protocol with individuals with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, when compared to a control group. Again,
these difficulties were mainly recorded in the reversal trials
(Villatte et al., 2010b). Evidence of impaired flexibility in deictic
responding has also been recorded in participants categorized
as high in social anhedonia, in this case on double reversal
trials (Villatte et al., 2008). Also, lower accuracies on reversal
trials have been found with individuals experiencing social
anxiety (Janssen et al., 2014). Difficulties in responding to
deictic relations may result in problems in other areas of social
cognition as well. For example, in a similar relational protocol,
Villatte et al. (2010a) found that people with schizophrenia or
high social anhedonia were less accurate in attributing true
or false beliefs to another. Vilardaga (2009) also argued that
empathy could be understood by examining deictic perspective-
taking relations. Similar to more cognitive accounts of empathy
(Lamm et al., 2007), he emphasizes the importance of being
able to define the origin of the expected feelings, or in RFT
terms, of being able to accurately distinguish between one’s own
perspective (HERE-NOW) and what is spoken about (THERE-
THEN).
Taken together, it is interesting that the relational protocol has
shown precise deficits in perspective-taking in samples, whose
diagnoses are characterized by difficult social relationships.
Furthermore, the combined results of these studies (based on
visual inspection of the data) show that these clinical samples
generally perform best on I–YOU trials, followed by NOW–
THEN trials, with poorer performances on HERE–THERE trials.
That is, while these individuals appear to experience more
difficulties in complex perspective-taking, the data also indicates
possible differences in the development of perspective-taking
relations compared to non-clinical populations. These results are
consistent with the Hardy-Baylé model of schizophrenia as well,
as they indicate that processing of spatial–temporal contextual
information in social interaction is deficient in people with
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (Hardy-Bayle, 1994; Sarfati
and Hardy-Baylé, 1999).
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Remediating Deficits in Deictic Relations
Currently, one area of RFT research is focusing on the
remediation of these deficits as observed in various clinical
samples. Specifically, several studies with typically developing
children have already highlighted the utility of combining the
original protocol trials with feedback as a successful means of
establishing the target relational performances. For example,
McHugh et al. (2008) demonstrated how these perspective-
taking skills were successfully facilitated or established in
small samples of young children (Barnes-Holmes, unpublished
doctoral thesis; McHugh, unpublished doctoral thesis). Similar
studies have found that these effects also generalize to natural
language (Heagle and Rehfeldt, 2006; Weil et al., 2011). Overall,
these results indicate that deictic relations can be successfully
trained when they are deficient, and results from a few recent
studies suggest that the same principles apply to clinical
populations experiencing perspective-taking difficulties. In one
of these studies, Jackson et al. (2014) successfully trained
deictic relational responding in three children with an ASD,
although generalization to ToM performance was not found
(Jackson et al., 2014). The authors of that work suggested that
a more extensive training protocol, targeting each perspective-
taking relation separately in each level of complexity, might
benefit learning outcomes with this population and help to
improve generalization to ToM skills. Improvements in relational
perspective-taking were also found in a study by Lovett and
Rehfeldt (2014), who trained three adolescents with Asperger’s
syndrome. O’Neill and Weil (2014) studied the effects of a similar
training program in three patients diagnosed with schizophrenia
and found improvements in deictic responding. Furthermore, all
participants showed some improvements in ToM performance
(O’Neill and Weil, 2014). In another study, the current authors
are examining the effectiveness of relational perspective-taking
training in samples with social anxiety, with initial unpublished
results showing increased performances on these types of
trials. In short, existing results suggest that perspective-taking
can be successfully trained in clinical samples, and may thus
potentially provide promising applications to benefit current
treatments.
CONCLUSION
Thus far, RFT research has been able to determine precisely
and functionally the components that comprise perspective-
taking; has allowed for a detailed developmental profile of
these skills from early childhood until adulthood; and has
identified several populations experiencing difficulties in this
area. Results of some initial RFT studies have suggested that
perspective-taking can be trained and generalized successfully
by combining deictic relational trials with feedback, and
these principles are currently being examined in clinical
populations experiencing perspective-taking difficulties.
This type of research not only helps to clarify the key
role of perspective-taking in social cognitive functioning,
but also provides practical methods of relational training
to complement current treatments of (social cognitive)
psychopathology.
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